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Abstract
Our objective is to identify a way of checking empirically the extent to
which expectations are de-coupled from inﬂation, how well they might be
anchored in the long run, and at what level. This methodology allows us
then to identify a measure for the degree of anchorness, and as anchored
expectations are associated with credibility, this will serve as a proxy
for credibility. We apply this methodology to the US history of inﬂation
since 1963 and examine how well our measure tracks the periods for which
credibility is known to be either low or high. Of particular interest to the
validity of the measure is the start of the Great Moderation. Following
the narrative of a number of well documented incidents in this period, we
check how well our measure captures both the evolution of credibility in
US monetary policy, as well as reactions to inﬂation scares.
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11 Introduction
There is little disagreement that credibility is crucial to successful monetary
policy. Numerous attempts in the literature have tried to deﬁne it, explain why
it is necessary to have it and how it can be earned and maintained. Institu-
tional commitment to a nominal anchor (Mishkin, 2007), or any explicit form
of commitment more generally, (Albanesi et al, 2003 and Christiano and Gust,
2000), are often thought to promote price stability and are considered crucial to
the successful management of inﬂation expectations. Commitment, in general,
is the key ingredient to establishing credibility, and more so in the most re-
cent theory on optimal monetary policy, referred to as the new-neoclassical (or
new-Keynesian) synthesis (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999; Woodford, 2003).
Empirically, a number of studies have shown the beneﬁcial eﬀects of a successful
commitment to a nominal anchor, in terms of more stable and less persistent
inﬂation (Levin et al 2004, Gürkaynak et al 2006) but also in terms of lower
volatility of output ﬂuctuations (Fatás et al 2007; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel,
2002, 2007). Commitment to a well deﬁned and credible nominal anchor has
thus an eﬀect on the dynamic relationship between inﬂation expectations and
realized inﬂation. As such, a fully credible and transparent monetary policy
provides an anchor for inﬂation expectations, and therefore de-couples them
from short run inﬂation dynamics (Demertzis and Viegi, 2007).
Using this intuition, the purpose of this paper is two-fold: ﬁrst, we propose
a method for assessing the extent to which expectations are de-coupled from
inﬂation. Hence, we identify a means for checking empirically whether expec-
tations are anchored in the long run, and at what level. In this respect, the
extent of anchoring will serve as a proxy for credibility. Second, to be able to
assess how capable this measure is of identifying credibility correctly, we need
to cross-check it against periods for which the level of credibility is known and
generally agreed upon. To this end, we apply the measure to the US inﬂation
history since 1963, which includes both the period of the Great Inﬂation, in
which credibility was known to have been poor and deteriorating, as well as
the period of the Great Moderation during which credibility in the monetary
authority was gradually re-established. Of particular interest is the evolution of
credibility during the early eighties, associated with Volcker’s Disinﬂation, in
which monetary policy makers worried explicitly about the way that ‘inﬂation-
ary psychology’ was aﬀecting their ability to be eﬀective (Goodfriend and King
2005). Aiming to align these expectations with their own inﬂation objectives
as well as eﬀectively bringing inﬂation down, the Fed engaged in persistently
aggressive policies. This was done at great costs to output in that period, but
helped reverse the inﬂationary trend thereafter, and hence improve credibility,
(Goodfriend 1993, 2007).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes how anchorness and
credibility can be ﬁrst identiﬁed and then measured. We propose a number
of tests for identifying whether expectations are anchored. Section 3 presents
2a number of stylized facts about US inﬂation and inﬂation expectations that
allow us to divide periods according to their level of credibility. Section 4 then
presents the results on the extent of anchorness for the diﬀerent periods. Section
5 presents the evolution of credibility in the US since 1963 based on our measure,
and attempts to track well-documented incidents of monetary policy behavior.
Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 A Theory of Anchorness
In our attempt to examine anchorness we will consider a reduced form model
for inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. Looking at inﬂation ﬁrst, it is straight-
forward to show that inﬂation is aﬀected by the level of expectations. Assume a
model in which the Central Bank has a standard loss function in which it chooses
the rate of inﬂation π to minimize the distance from the inﬂation objective set











subject to a standard Lucas supply function, yt = πt − πe
t + ξt where ξ is a
supply shock with zero mean and constant variance, σ2













where πt is now the ex post inﬂation outcome conditional on the shock ξt,
before solving for private sector expectations, πe
t. In a typical commitment set-
up, where the Central Bank commits to the target πT, expectations formed are
equal to the CB’s objectives, πe
t = πT, and the ex post outcome is:




E(π) = πT. (4)
However, it is questionable as to whether empirically it is justiﬁed to reduce (2)
into (3). We would like to explore how inﬂation expectations actually evolve.
To this end, we base our formulation on Bomﬁn and Rudebusch (2000), who
assume that long-run inﬂation expectations at time t, denoted πe
t, are a weighted
average of a constant π∗ (which in their case is the current target) and last
period’s inﬂation rate:
πe
t = λtπ∗ + (1 − λt)πt−1. (5)
Parameter λt (∈ [0,1]) then indexes the degree of anchorness of inﬂation ex-
pectations. If λt = 1, then inﬂation expectations are perfectly anchored to the
constant π∗, which for inﬂation targeting regimes can be cross-checked against
3the inﬂation objective πT communicated. Credible regimes will then be those
for which both λt = 1 as well π∗ = πT hold. It follows that if λt = 0, there
is no credibility, the inﬂation target is ignored in the formation of expectations
and expectations simply follow past inﬂation. For countries that do not have
an explicit inﬂation objective, such as the US, the value of parameter λ alone is
then a proxy for credibility. The formation of expectations based on (5) is also
consistent with expectations formed either heuristically (Brazier et al 2008), or
based on an information game (Demertzis and Viegi, 2008). However, while
expectations are a continuum between a constant and last period’s inﬂation in
(5), the latter two approaches assume a discrete switch between the two values.
In both approaches however, credibility is the ‘lever’ that moves expectations
from one state to the other.
2.1 Testing for Anchorness
The main observation of the previous analysis is that a credible regime will
be characterized by a disconnect between inﬂation and inﬂation expectations
dynamics. In what follows we identify how this disconnect would manifest itself
in the data, and then how inﬂation expectations are anchored once they are
disconnected from historical inﬂation experience.
Following (2) and (5), and allowing for the presence of dynamics, we model πt
and πe









































Conjecture 1 A credible inﬂation expectations disconnect would imply that the
following hypotheses are satisﬁed:
H1: Expected inﬂation is not aﬀected by lagged actual inﬂation, i.e., c(L) = 0.
H2: Expected inﬂation is anchored to a constant on average, i.e., c(L) = 0 and
d(L) = 0.
H3: Actual inﬂation is not aﬀected by expected inﬂation, i.e., b(L) = 0.
H4: The persistence of actual inﬂation, the sum of the coeﬃcients of a(L),
decreases with credibility.
H5: There is no contemporaneous transmission of shocks from actual to ex-
pected inﬂation and vice versa, i.e., σ12 = 0.
We test hypotheses H1-H3 with standard Wald tests. In particular, H1 and
H3 correspond to Granger non-causality of, respectively, actual inﬂation for ex-
pected inﬂation, and expected inﬂation for actual inﬂation. If there is evidence
4of some heteroskedasticity in the errors, we apply a robust (HAC based) version
of the Wald test. We examine hypothesis 4 by comparing estimated persistence
in diﬀerent periods for which credibility of monetary policy is known. Hypothe-
sis 5 can be veriﬁed by checking the non-signiﬁcance of the correlation between
the VAR errors (corr(e1t,e2t) = 0) by applying a Fisher transform test. Note
that H1, H3 and H5 jointly imply that all elements of the impulse response
function (IRF) of actual inﬂation to a shock in expectations are zero, and the
same should hold for the IRF of expected inﬂation to a shock in actual inﬂation.
2.2 A Proxy for Credibility
We turn next to the way expectations are formed. Note that (5) assumes a
priori that inﬂation expectations do not depend on their own past behavior,
i.e., d(L) = 0 in (6). However, this hypothesis should be tested and, as we
will see in the next section, it is empirically systematically rejected. Hence, we
use a VAR approach to provide a more general measure of λ. Our prior is that
credible monetary policy implies that expectations are de-coupled from inﬂation
(low correlation) and are anchored to an ‘implicit’ target. Expectations are then
partly following that implicit ‘anchor’ π∗. We derive the values of λ and π∗ next.
Consider for simplicity the VAR(1) version of (6):
πt = a0 + aπt−1 + bπe
t−1 + e1t (7)
πe
t = c0 + cπt−1 + dπe
t−1 + e2t,































Empirically, λ and π∗ can be estimated by substituting parameters c0, c and d
with their estimates from (7). Parameter λ will serve as a proxy for credibility
5and the estimated value of π∗ as the implicit long-term anchor for inﬂation
expectations.
Last, we make the following remarks. First, λ in (10) is not constrained to
belong to the [0,1] interval. Using the VAR coeﬃcients it can be re-written as:
c = (1 − λ)(1 − d),
which yields
πe
t = c0 + (1 − λ)(1 − d)πt−1 + dπe
t−1 + e2t. (12)
Second, the formulae for λ and π∗, and the restrictions on the VAR parameters,
can be easily extended to allow for higher order VARs (see Appendix A for
the general result). Third, we consider a constant equilibrium (long-run) value
for credibility (see Argov et al, 2007) and estimate the VARs over sub-periods
where credibility is believed to be fairly constant. An alternative approach is
to estimate the VAR over the whole sample and allow its parameters to be
time-varying, as we will explain further down. Finally, it is worth mentioning
that our measure of credibility is precisely the one employed by King (1995),
who analyzes the diﬀerence between long-run inﬂation expectations (derived
from nominal and real yield curves) and inﬂation targets. It is also close to
the expectational deﬁnitions in Johnson (1998, 2002) and Croushore and Koot
(1994), who use short-run inﬂation expectations from surveys.
3 Stylized facts
We describe brieﬂy the US inﬂation history from 1963 to 2007. Our main
analysis will be done using series for CPI inﬂation1 and long term expectations
produced by the FRB model of the Fed. We will also look at two other survey-
based measures for long term inﬂation, namely, (SPF) Federal Reserve Bank of
Philidelphia’s survey of professional long-run (10-year) inﬂation forecasts (quar-
terly), and the 6-10 years Consensus Forecasts (semi-annual). Both series start
in 19902.
3.1 Inﬂation and Inﬂation Expectations
Figure 1 plots CPI inﬂation and FRB long term expectations. The literature
typically identiﬁes three distinct periods in the conduct and eﬀectiveness of
1Quarterly, y-o-y changes of CPI, 1963q1-2007q1. Appendix C will discuss also our main
results based on PCE series for inﬂation, as this is the one used to represent inﬂation most
often. However, Clark (1999) argues that when comparing the pros and cons of the two series
CPI is the better index.
2The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) expectations series follows the SPF closely for most
of its history. However, based on a learning model developed by Kozicki and Tinsley (1996),
the series estimates a longer historical perspective. This permits us to carry out the analysis
starting in 1963.
6monetary policy (Goodfriend, 2007). First is the period of the Great Inﬂation
during the late ’60s and ’70s. This is a period where inﬂation was steadily
increasing with three noticeable peaks at 1969q4, 1974q4 and 1980q1 (see ﬁgure
1). The on-going debate on the sources of this pattern for inﬂation, summarized
in Cecchetti et al. (2007), attributes it mostly to the behavior of oil and raw
material prices, combined with an insuﬃciently tight monetary policy. Over this
period, inﬂation expectations were also steadily increasing, but less than actual
inﬂation, and remained systematically below actual inﬂation. This is generally
considered a period of deteriorating credibility.


































Figure 1: Inﬂation and Inﬂation Expectations
The second period identiﬁed, the ’80s, is characterized by an overall downward
trend in the level of inﬂation, associated with the Volcker Disinﬂation. Figure 1
shows that the decline in the long term FRB expectations was less pronounced,
with a prolonged period of expectations above actual inﬂation. Goodfriend and
King (2005) argue that this was also a period of poor credibility, which was the
cause of the high costs of disinﬂation observed. In the third period, identiﬁed
approximately between 1991 and 2007, we observe relatively stable inﬂation
accompanied by a further decline in the long term inﬂation expectations, which
stabilizes at a value around 2 per cent after 2000. This is generally believed to
be a period of relatively high credibility, which as we shall see becomes full in
the new century.
A similar picture emerges when looking at the descriptive statistics for the
corresponding periods in Table 1. We report the standard statistics as well as
the level of persistence and the correlation of actual and expected inﬂation3.
Average and median values of actual and expected inﬂation steadily decrease
across the three periods, and average expected inﬂation is higher than average
3Persistence is measured as the sum of the autoregressive coeﬃcients in an AR(4) model
with a constant. We examine the signiﬁcance of the correlation coeﬃcients between the
7actual inﬂation, only in the second period, the ’80s. The range and standard
deviation shrink progressively over time. While this is a well known feature
for inﬂation, a similar pattern emerges also for the expectations, the standard
deviation of which reduces from 1.41 in 1968-80 to 0.54 in 1991-07. Furthermore,
there is a noticeable decrease in the persistence of inﬂation. This is not the case
for inﬂation expectations. In addition, and perhaps more interestingly, the
correlation between actual and expected inﬂation drops from 0.81 in the ’70s
to 0.40 in 91-06 and is statistically insigniﬁcant after the year 2000. The latter
period is also characterized by a major drop in the volatility and persistence of
inﬂation expectations. Our results remain unchanged if we move the start and
ending point of the three periods by a few quarters.
Table 1. Inﬂation and long run FRB inﬂation expectations, (and H4)
Sample 68q1-80q4 81q1-90q4 91q1-06q4 01q1-07q1
Infl Infle Infl Infle Infl Infle Infl Infle
Mean 7.31 4.31 4.68 5.17 2.73 2.35 2.76 1.95
Median 6.28 4.45 4.22 4.86 2.75 1.95 2.78 1.95
Max 14.68 7.05 10.96 7.72 4.89 3.79 4.67 2.00
Min 2.84 1.68 1.13 3.50 1.06 1.75 1.06 1.90
St.Dev. 3.17 1.41 2.19 1.09 0.80 0.54 0.89 0.02
Persistence 0.91 0.99 0.83 0.96 0.60 0.93 0.37 -0.12
Corr with Inﬂ - 0.81 - 0.54 - 0.40 - -0.15
Note: bold indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Last, we examine how FRB long term inﬂation expectations compare to other
measures of inﬂation expectations for overlapping periods. Figure 2 plots the
three series as well as CPI inﬂation.
Table 2 summarizes the main descriptive statistics for long term expectations
FRB, the Consensus Forecast and the Survey of Professional Forecasters.






This statistic is approximately normally distributed, with mean zero and standard deviation
σ = (n − 3)− 1
2 , where n is the sample size. Bold indicates signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at
the 5% level.
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FRB Prof Forecasters: CPI Inflation Rate Over the Next 10 Years: Median (%)  6-10-Year CPI Inflation
Source: Cecchetti et al (2007)
Figure 2: Alternative Measures for Inﬂation Expectations
Table 2. Alternative long run inﬂation expectations
Consensus (6-10) FRB SPF
Infl Infle Infle Infle
Mean 2.87 2.97 2.43 2.90
Median 2.76 2.70 1.97 2.50
Max 6.10 4.30 3.79 4.15
Min 1.06 2.10 1.90 2.45
St.Dev. 1.02 0.63 0.63 0.54
Persistence 0.71 0.95 0.85 0.85
Corr with Inﬂ - 0.48 0.57 0.42
Sample 90:s1-07:s1 90:s1-07:s1 90:s1-06:s2 91:s2-06:s2
Note: bold indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
The diﬀerences between the three measures of expectations are minor: FRB
has a slightly lower average and median value and shorter range of variability,
while SPF has a slightly lower standard deviation and correlation with actual
inﬂation. Overall the three series of inﬂation expectations move closely together,
(correl(Cons, FRB)=0.96, correl(Cons, SPF)=0.96, correl(FRB, SPF)=0.99).
The contemporaneous correlation of actual and expected inﬂation is 0.48, 0.57
and 0.42 for the three measures respectively. However, these values can be
spuriously upward biased, due to their overall decreasing behavior in the period
examined. Hence, the issue of correlation needs to be addressed within a formal
dynamic model, as we will see in the next section.
94 Results for Anchorness
We present our results in the following order. We start with results for the
period between 1968 and 1980 as a period of low credibility, using the series on
FRB expectations only. We then test our model for the period between 1990
and 2007, as one where monetary policy is relatively credible. In the following
section we will test whether this chronological classiﬁcation is justiﬁed. For this
latter period we carry out tests based on all three available expectations series.
Last we repeat the analysis with a time-varying VAR as in Stock and Watson
(1996) and thus examine the stability of the coeﬃcients of the VAR across the
whole sample 1968-2007, inclusive of the Volcker disinﬂation period, during the
80s. This technique will allow us to examine how parameter λ has evolved across
the whole sample, in the next section. For each of the sub-sections that follow,
there is a corresponding sub-section in Appendix B describing the econometric
methodology and robustness checks in greater detail.
4.1 1968-1980: A Period of Low credibility
The period generally associated with the Great Inﬂation is dated to start in
1965 and is to last for about 20 years, after which Volcker’s period of disinﬂation
begins to bear results. This period is also associated with low and deteriorating
credibility and generally an inability to control inﬂation (Cecchetti et al 2007).
Meltzer (2005) attributes this to a number of reasons, including both lack of
knowledge of how the underlying economy worked at the time, as well policy and
institutional choices/arrangements made. Given this general description of the
time-period, we evaluate the performance of the VAR model and the outcome of
tests for hypotheses 1-5, for the period up to the end 19794. Our choice of ending
point is motivated by the appointment of Volcker as the chairman of the Federal
Reserve, which is identiﬁed with the start of a new era in monetary policy
eﬀectiveness. Our main ﬁnding is that over this period hypotheses 1 and 3, no
eﬀects of actual inﬂation on long term expectations, and vice versa, are strongly
rejected, (see Table 3 below). Hypothesis 5 is not rejected, indicating that
there is still no evidence of contemporaneous shock transmission (insigniﬁcant
correlation).
Table 3. Granger Causality (H1, H3 and H5)
Dependent Excluded df χ2 (Pr) core1,e2
π πe
FRB 6 27.19 (0.00) -0.17
πe
FRB π 6 22.49 (0.00)
Notes: Bold indicates signiﬁcance at 5% level.
In summary, there appears to be a lot of interaction between actual inﬂation
and long term inﬂation expectations over a period of low credibility. Based on
4Note that if λ is equal, or close, to zero, the VAR framework is not suited due to perfect
collinearity between the regressors. In this case a single equation approach along the lines of
(5) would be appropriate. However, we have never found such a case to be true in practice
(correlations in Table 1 are at most 0.81).
10the VAR(2) choice, the IRFs in ﬁgure 3 show that there is great persistence in
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Response of FRB to FRB
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 3: FRB Expectations, 1968-1980
Our analysis demonstrates that for a period of generally deteriorating perfor-
mance in inﬂation and low credibility, there is a close relationship between
inﬂation and the way expectations are formed, even in the long run.
4.2 1990-2007: A Period of High Credibility
Goodfriend (2007) describes US monetary policy of this period as follows: “Un-
der Greenspan’s leadership, the Fed demonstrated additional practical princi-
ples of monetary policy that have become part of the new consensus. The most
important is that monetary policy could sustain low inﬂation with low unem-
ployment on average, and with infrequent, mild recessions.” This period is one
in which inﬂation is on a long declining trend, eventually becoming stationary
after the year 2000. We check for anchorness in this period based on three
alternative measures for expectations.
The lag length selection criteria indicate 5 lags for the series FRB and SPF
and 1 lag for the Consensus Forecasts. From the Wald tests for hypotheses 1
and 3, which are reported in table 4 below, expected inﬂation is not signiﬁcant
in the actual inﬂation equation, and vice versa.5 Moreover, the correlation in
the VAR residuals is not statistically diﬀerent from zero (although the test fails
when using FRB expectations).
5A robust version of the Wald test yields the same results, the p-values are, respectively,
0.56 and 0.56.
11Table 4. Granger Causality (H1, H3 and H5)
Depend. Excluded df χ2 (Pr) core1,e2
(1989s2 2007s1)
π πe
FRB 5 2.30 (0.81) 0.38
πe
FRB π 5 3.63 (0.60)
(1991s2 2006s2)
π πe
SPF_10Y 5 2.39 (0.79) 0.15
πe
SPF_10Y π 5 1.71 (0.89)
(1990s2 2007s2)
π πe
(6−10) 1 0.43 (0.51) 0.28
πe
(6−10) π 1 0.63 (0.43)
Note: Bold indicates signiﬁcance at 5% level.
As already mentioned, the joint validity of hypotheses 1, 3, 5 should imply that
each value of the cross IRF is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. This is indeed
the case, with the only exception of the small and positive reaction of the FRB
expectation measure (in line with the ﬁndings of Table 4). Figures 4-6 report
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Response of FRB to FRB
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 4: FRB Expectations, 1989-2007
Hypothesis 2 however, (no persistence in expected inﬂation), is strongly rejected.
The estimated persistence (the coeﬃcient of lagged expected inﬂation in this
case), for example for Consensus forecasts is 0.95, similar to the result from the
AR(4) reported in Table 1. The estimated persistence in inﬂation is instead 0.57,
again in line with the previous ﬁnding based on the AR(4) model. Figures 4-6
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Response of SPF_10Y to SPF_10Y
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 5: SPF Expectations, 1989-2007
the fact that shocks that hit expectations are much smaller in size by comparison
to inﬂation.
Summarizing, our results for this period, using 3 alternative measures for in-
ﬂation, show neither contemporaneous nor dynamic statistically signiﬁcant cor-
relation between actual values and long term expectations of inﬂation. This
stands in contrast to the earlier period described above, where the relationship
between the two variables was tighter. There appears therefore to be a discon-
nect between inﬂation and expectations for periods when monetary policy is
generally considered to be credible. We examine next the stability of our para-
meters across the whole period, and thus describe also monetary policy during
the 80s.
4.3 A Time-Varying VAR
So far we have assumed that there are discrete changes in the parameters of the
VAR in (6), which deﬁne periods with diﬀerent credibility of monetary policy.
The results we have obtained are fairly robust to changes in the start/end date
of the sub-periods. As an alternative, we consider VARs with time-varying
parameters estimated over the whole sample, along the lines of, for example,
Stock and Watson (1996), Cogley and Sargent (2005), or Clark and Nakata
(2008). Based on Stock and Watson (1996) we specify a time-varying VAR(1)
version of (6) as follows:
πt = a0t + atπt−1 + btπe
t−1 + e1t, (13)
πe
t = c0t + ctπt−1 + dtπe
t−1 + e2t,
where each parameter is assumed to evolve according to a random walk, the er-
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Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 6: Consensus Forecasts (6-10), 1990-2007
errors, and the VAR errors are assumed to be uncorrelated and homoskedastic.
We estimate model (13) by the Kalman ﬁlter and ﬁgure 7 below reports the
(smoothed) estimates of the time-varying parameters.
Starting with the inﬂation equation, parameter at decreases, on the whole, over
time. It becomes relatively constant for the period between 1981-2000 and then
decreases. The opposite occurs for parameter a0t, which increases in the latter
period. Parameter bt is fairly constant at about 0.4, with peaks in the mid 70’s
and early ’80s (with values that become statistically signiﬁcant for a few quarters
after 1978), associated with peaks in at. Overall, these results are in line with
our earlier observations, namely that the ’70s were a problematic period, in
the sense of being fairly unstable, that inﬂation persistence decreases across the
decades (as measured by the at parameter), and that inﬂation expectations can
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on actual inﬂation when credibility is thought to be low
(the bt parameter).
In the inﬂation expectations equations, the ct parameter is higher in the ’70s
and early ’80s, declines after that, and reaches values close to zero in the most
recent period. The dt parameter increases steadily up to the early ’80s, then
declines until the end of the ’90s, and stabilizes afterward. Again these results
are coherent with the picture emerging from the split sample VARs. In the
absence of credibility, inﬂation expectations are more persistent, and can be
directly aﬀected by the evolution of actual inﬂation, while the two variables are
de-coupled when credibility is restored.6
6We should point out that we ﬁnd much more evidence of instability in the relation between
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Figure 7: Time-Varying VAR
5 A Measure for Credibility
Based on the estimated parameters from the time-varying VAR (ﬁgure 7), we
calculate the time varying λ (from 10) and its standard errors, for the period
from 1963 till 2007. Figure 8 shows that the value of λ, and by proxy also
credibility, has varied signiﬁcantly across the whole period. It is important
therefore to discuss this measure separately for diﬀerent periods.
Using next our estimates for λ, we can in turn estimate π∗ (from 11). While
the estimate of λ indicates the extent to which expectations are anchored to a
constant, (and therefore, past inﬂation does not aﬀect expectations), π∗ provides
an estimate for what that anchor might be. Figure 9 plots CPI inﬂation and
FRB expectations, as well the estimated values for λ and π∗.
The period of the Great Inﬂation, from 1965 to the early 1980s, was charac-
terized by both high as well as very volatile inﬂation, and reached its peak in
1980q1. Meltzer (2005) writes “...The Great Inﬂation of 1965 to the mid-1980s
was the central monetary event of the latter half of the 20th century. Its eco-
nomic cost was large. It destroyed the Bretton Woods system of ﬁxed exchange
rates, bankrupted much of the thrift industry, heavily taxed the U.S. capital
stock, and arbitrarily redistributed income and wealth.” Our measure of credi-
bility, λ, exhibits a considerable decline in this period, starting from a value of
1 and reducing to a value 0.75. At the same time, the implicit long run antici-




















































































































































Figure 8: Estimated λ and its signiﬁcance (±2SE)
pated inﬂation increased steadily, following the trend, and more often than not
also the level, of FRB expectations closely. This is in our view consistent with
the perception that for this period monetary policy was loosing credibility.
The period of the end of the 1970s and early 1980s was to see two important
events for the course of inﬂation thereafter: ﬁrst was the appointment of Volcker
at the summer of 1979 and second, inﬂation reached its peak in the ﬁrst quarter
of 1980. This marked the start of what has come to be known as the ‘Volcker
Disinﬂation’ period associated with the start of a long and declining path for
inﬂation for the following 10-15 years. And while there is no doubt about the
importance of this period in terms of altering the long term inﬂation trend,
there is some discussion as to what the associated cost has been. Goodfriend
and King (2005) argue that “...the reduction in inﬂation engineered by the
Fed under Volcker was accompanied by substantial output losses ... because it
was viewed as not credible, in the sense that ﬁrms and households believed for
several years that the reduction in inﬂation was temporary with a return to high
inﬂation likely.”, (p983). Indeed ﬁgure 9 concurs this view, in the sense that
credibility of that period is the lowest in the whole sample. It also shows that
even though inﬂation reached its peak in 1980q1, credibility continued to fall for
another four quarters before changing direction. It required therefore a year of
rapidly declining inﬂation before the public began to change its opinion. This
delay in public perceptions is also alluded to by Goodfriend and King (2005)
who argue “...that the Volcker disinﬂation did not really start in earnest until
late 1980 or early 1981.”7
Figure 10 concentrates on the Volcker disinﬂation period, which saw four ‘in-
ﬂation scares’ identiﬁed by Goodfriend (1993)8. Our objective is to map the
7Goodfriend (2005) has the timing of the reversal slightly later, in the summer of 1982,
based on evidence on long bond rates.

















































Figure 9: The Evolution of Credibility
evolution of credibility during this period to the events themselves. The ﬁrst of
these inﬂation scares was observed at the start of 1980. “In retrospect, 1980 was
a disaster from a monetary policy point of view. The U.S. economy suﬀered a
recession along with a destabilizing inﬂation scare and policy reaction, and yet
at the end of the year, inﬂation remained above 10 percent. The events of 1980
heightened public unhappiness with inﬂation”, Goodfriend (2007). Indeed we
see that after the ﬁrst inﬂation scare there is substantial loss in credibility (of
about 10 basis points), even though inﬂation is already declining. The second
inﬂation scare in 1981 was accompanied with an extraordinarily tight monetary
policy, which was a very hard choice to make as the recession deepened, but
proved beneﬁcial in term of reversing, and sustaining, the downward path in
credibility.
The third inﬂation scare, in the summer of 1984, was met with an equally
determined Fed- “For the ﬁrst time in its history, the Fed successfully employed
interest rate policy to hold the line on inﬂation (at 4 percent) without creating
a recession.”, Goodfriend (2007). The graph demonstrates how credibility is
increasing throughout the length of the third inﬂation scare, at levels which allow
a costless tightening “...indicating that the Volcker Fed had acquired credibility
for 4 percent trend inﬂation.”, Goodfriend (2007). Parameter λ is now above 0.9
and increasing, and both expectations as well as the implicit π∗ have stabilized
at just above 4 percent.
The fourth inﬂation scare in October 1987 was qualitatively diﬀerent. It is true
that it took a number of years to revert (bond yields returned to their 1987



























Figure 10: The Volcker Disinﬂation
had improved considerably and the level of anchorness λ was hovering between
0.9 and 0.95. Alan Greenspan had replaced Volcker as chairman of the Fed in
1987, but the credibility acquired under the Volcker Fed was sustained, allowing
for inﬂation expectations to continue to fall. It would take 15 years (till the end
of 1990s) for the inﬂation rate to stabilize around the 2 percent level, (ﬁgure
9), at which point the Fed became fully credible, showing that “(T)he Federal
Reserve under Greenspan was patient in moving toward its implicit inﬂation
target”, Goodfriend (2007).
Finally it is worth making a comment about the last four quarters on the graph
(ﬁgure 9), leading up to, and including, 2008q1. Inﬂation expectations for the
ﬁrst time in 10 years are above the 2 per cent mark, at a level of 2.1 per cent. At
the same time inﬂation is consistently above 2 per cent, since the middle of 2004.
This causes λ to enter a declining path, which reaches the value of 0.97 at the
last date of our sample. Two questions arise: ﬁrst, when will that trend revert
and second, which is the critical threshold for λ, below which monetary policy
is no longer credible. The ﬁrst question is naturally very diﬃcult to answer,
especially in view of the events in the ﬁnancial markets since then. On the
second question however, history shows us that periods during which monetary
policy was considered to be credible corresponded to values of λ generally greater
than 0.9. Although not a formal test, this would imply that there is still some
way (buﬀer) for expectations to move away from the implicit anchor, before
credibility is compromised.
186 Conclusions
Credibility is crucially important to the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy be-
cause it allows the ﬂexibility to deal with shocks without changing the trend
of inﬂation, or it allows monetary authorities to disinﬂate without much cost
on real interest rates and output. Our conjecture has been that for credible
regimes there is a disconnect between inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. We
have expressed this in terms of ﬁve hypotheses, which we have then proceeded
to test. Our empirical set-up has allowed us to develop a measure for the extent
to which expectations might be anchored, as well as at what level. The contri-
bution of this paper is therefore to provide a method for quantifying anchorness
and therefore also a proxy for credibility, in applied monetary policy.
We apply this measure to US data since 1963. As the history of monetary policy
in the US has periods for which credibility is known to be low, as well as periods
for which it is known to be high, we check how well this measure compares to the
way the literature describes them. We ﬁnd that it typically matches the general
description of the diﬀerent levels of credibility across diﬀerent periods. We also
test the measure against four incidents of inﬂation scares, as documented by
Goodfriend (1993), and show that the measure typically tracks the timing as
well as direction of changes in credibility. Equally important in implementing
this approach is the realization that credibility and the underlying anchor are not
constant but are subject to changes as new data becomes available, an important
reminder that credibility can be gained but it can also be lost. Having seen how
this technique applies in the US, we intend to apply it to a number of diﬀerent
countries in our future work.
19APPENDICES
A A measure of credibility from a VAR(p)
The VAR(p) equations are:
πt = a0 + a1πt−1 + ... + apπt−p + b1πe
t−1 + ... + bpπe
t−p + e1t
πe
t = c0 + c1πt−1 + ... + cpπt−p + d1πe
t−1 + ... + dpπe
t−p + e2t
In the long run it is:
π = a0 + a1π + ... + apπ + b1πe + ... + +bpπe
πe = c0 + c1π + ... + cpπ + d1πe + ... + dpπe
and
(1 − a1 − ...ap)π = a0 + (b1 + ...bp)πe
π =
a0
1 − a1 − ... − ap
+
b1 + ... + bp
1 − a1 − ... − ap
πe and
(1 − d1 − ...dp)πe = c0 + (c1 + ...cp)π
πe =
c0
1 − d1 − ... − dp
+
c1 + ... + cp





1 − d1 − ... − dp
1 − λ =
c1 + ... + cp
1 − d1 − ... − dp
.
The non-linear restrictions to be imposed on the VAR coeﬃcients to ensure that
λ ∈ [0,1] can be derived as for the VAR(1) case. For example, for the VAR(2)
case, it is
πe




λ = 1 −
c1 + c2
1 − d1 − d2
π∗ =
c0








In the empirical implementation, the lag length of the VAR is chosen based
on recursive likelihood ratio tests for the non-signiﬁcance of the longest lag
and on the Schwarz (BIC) information criterion, starting with a VAR(4). In
both cases, the statistical congruence of the model is controlled by means of
standard diagnostic tests on the residuals for no correlation, homoskedasticity
and normality. These hypotheses are typically not rejected, in particular when
the lag selection is based on testing. When the testing and information criteria
give conﬂicting results on the lag length of the VAR, two VARs of diﬀerent order
are estimated in order to control the robustness of the results.
B.1 A note on Section 4.1
The recursive tests for lag length suggest a VAR(6), when starting with 8 lags,
while the Schwarz criterion indicates a VAR(2). Since the hypothesis of no serial
correlation of the errors is rejected for the latter, we continue the analysis with
the VAR(6), but there are minor diﬀerences in the results with the VAR(2).
We ﬁnd that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for either actual
or expected inﬂation over this sample, using an Augmented Dickey Fuller test.
While this outcome could be the result of a small sample power of the test, as a
ﬁnal check on the robustness of the results we have repeated the analysis with
an error correction model. We cannot reject the hypothesis of one cointegrating
vector by the Johansen trace test, but the restriction that the coeﬃcients of the
variables are 1 and −1 (i.e., that actual minus expected inﬂation is stationary)
is strongly rejected. Hypotheses 1 and 3 would require ﬁrst no cointegration
(otherwise the error correction term should be signiﬁcant in at least one of
the equations, creating a dynamic link between actual and expected inﬂation),
and, second, no signiﬁcance of the lagged diﬀerences of expected inﬂation in the
equation for the diﬀerence of actual inﬂation, and vice versa. Instead, we ﬁnd
cointegration, the error correction term is strongly signiﬁcant in both equations,
and the cross lags are also signiﬁcant.
B.2 A note on Section 4.2
As Cecchetti et al (2007) indicates, the FRB and SPF series follow each other
very closely, (corr=0.99) and that is why the VAR results are very similar. In
particular, in both cases the lag selection is either 5, when based on testing, or
1, when based on the Schwarz criterion. Since for the VAR(1) the hypothesis
of uncorrelated residuals is rejected, we present results based on the VAR(5).
However, those for the VAR(1) are qualitatively similar. Modelling actual in-
ﬂation and the Consensus expectation (inﬂation expectations 6-10 year ahead)
with a VAR over the period 1990-2007, the lag length selection criteria indicate
just one lag. From the Wald tests for hypotheses 1 and 3, which are reported
in table 4 expected inﬂation is not signiﬁcant in the actual inﬂation equation,
21and vice versa. A robust version of the Wald test yields the same results, as the
p-values are, respectively, 0.56 and 0.56.
Given the relatively high level of persistence estimated (0.95 for the Consensus
Forecasts, the highest of the three), it is worth examining whether we can as-
sume expectations to be stationary, or in other words whether the estimated
persistence of 0.95 is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1. The Augmented Dickey
Fuller test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root for inﬂation but not for in-
ﬂation expectations. However as the sample considered is relatively small, unit
root tests are not reliable. To examine the variables stationarity, we simulate
stochastically the VAR(1) model over the period 2007:1-2050:2, and evaluate,
ﬁrst, whether and how quickly the values of actual and expected inﬂation sta-
bilize and, second, whether the long-run equilibrium values are compatible with
the credibility assumption, in the sense that actual inﬂation is not statistically
diﬀerent from expected inﬂation. The simulation results show that both prop-
erties are satisﬁed, and the convergence to the equilibrium, in the absence of
shocks, is fairly quickly9.
Finally, Consensus reports data also on inﬂation expectations at shorter hori-
zons, speciﬁcally, 1, 3, and 5 years (labelled Inﬂ1, Inﬂ3, and Inﬂ5, respectively).
We have therefore repeated the analysis using these alternative series. In all
cases, a VAR(1) is selected by the Schwarz criterion and it is suﬃcient to obtain
uncorrelated, homoskedastic and normal residuals. The only exception is the
VAR for Inﬂ1 and Inﬂ, for which three lags are needed to avoid correlation in
the residuals, but qualitatively the results are equal to the VAR(1) case. For
all the three measures of expectations, the results of the hypothesis testing are
similar as for the Inﬂ10 case, in the sense that there is no dynamic or contem-
poraneous interaction between expectations and actual inﬂation emerging from
the VAR. This is not surprising for the 3- and 5-year horizon expectations, while
one might expect a stronger dependence of the short 1-year horizon expecta-
tion on actual inﬂation. Our ﬁnding for Inﬂ1 could be due to a timing issue,
a mismatch in timing between the expectation and realization data, which led
Johnson (2002) to suggest the use of a slightly modiﬁed deﬁnition of inﬂation.
Actually, when we adopt his deﬁnition of inﬂation we ﬁnd that Inﬂ is strongly
statistically signiﬁcant in the Inﬂ1 equation.
B.3 A note on Section 4.3
We discuss in more details here why our results diﬀer from those in Clark and
Nakata (2008). To start with, Clark and Nakata (2008) analyze actual minus
expected inﬂation and the change in expected inﬂation, rather than the levels
of the two variables as in our case. Moreover, they de-mean the variables using
a constant (full-sample) estimate for the mean, while we allow for changes in
the mean by including a time-varying ‘constant’ in the model. Hence, following
the speciﬁcation choices of Clark and Nakata (2008), the model in (13) would
9Results available from the authors.
22become:
(πt − πe
t −  π−πe) = at(πt−1 − πe
t−1 −  π−πe) + bt(πe
t−1 − πe




t−1 −  ∆π) = ct(πt−1 − πe
t−1 −  π−πe) + dt(πe
t−1 − πe
t−2 −  ∆π) + e2t.
Our theoretical model requires that we estimate the VAR in levels. But if we
estimate the model in (14), starting not in 1963 but in 1970 as in Clark and
Nakata (2008), we also ﬁnd much less evidence of parameter instability, (see
ﬁgure 11 below). Actually, coeﬃcients bt and ct are in practice stable, and the
variability of dt is very limited.10 Other diﬀerences with respect to Clark and
Nakata (2008) are in the precise deﬁnition of the variables, and in the fact that
they allow for stochastic volatility in the VAR errors, which does not appear to
be necessary in our case since the time-varying ‘constant’ already captures the
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Figure 11: Based on the model by Clark and Nakata
Last, since the analysis of the time-varying VAR has highlighted the sample
2000-2007 as a period of substantial stability, in line also with the descriptive
statistics of Table 2 and the graphical evidence of ﬁgure 1, it is worth repeating
the analysis with a constant parameter VAR focusing on this most recent period.
In addition to the results reported in Table 6 below, expected inﬂation does not
signiﬁcantly depend on its lag, and the persistence of inﬂation (as measured
10We should point out that we have experienced numerical convergence problems in the
estimation of the model in (14), which are not present for (13). However, Figure 11 is based
on a model for which convergence of the numerical estimation procedure is achieved.
23by the coeﬃcient of its own lag) drops to 0.47. Hence, all the hypotheses 1-5
appear to be satisﬁed for the US over the most recent period.
Table 6. Granger Causality (2000q1 2007q1)
Dependent Excluded df χ2 (Pr) core1,e2
π πe
FRB 1 0.28 (0.59) -0.21
πe
FRB π 1 0.11 (0.73)
Notes: Bold indicates signiﬁcance at 5% level.
C An alternative measure for inﬂation: CPE
We plot three alternative deﬁnitions for inﬂation based on CPE, CPE and core




















































Figure 12: Alternative Inﬂation Deﬁnitions
We then recalculate the credibility measure, λ, (grey line) based on CPE inﬂa-
tion (ﬁgure 13). It is worth remembering however, that the expectation measure
refers to CPI not CPE so that this derivation of λ is not entirely consistent. Since
the CPE series is both lower on average and less volatile, the corresponding λ
is also lower and smoother. This is particularly so for the start of the period
of the Great Moderation. The evolution of credibility however, matches our






























Figure 13: Credibility: CPI vs. CPE
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